Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam by Gregory A. Daddis
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Overview: A “better war.” Over the last two decades, this term has become synonymous with US strategy during the Vietnam War’s final years. The narrative is enticingly simple, appealing to many audiences. After the disastrous results of the 1968 Tet offensive, in which Hanoi’s forces demonstrated the failures of American strategy, popular history tells of a new American military commander who emerged in South Vietnam and with inspired leadership and a new approach turned around a long stalemated conflict. In fact, so successful was General Creighton Abrams in commanding US forces that, according to the “better war” myth, the United States had actually achieved victory by mid-1970. A new general with a new strategy had delivered, only to see his victory abandoned by weak-kneed politicians in Washington, DC who turned their backs on the US armed forces and their South Vietnamese allies.
Genre: Non-Fiction, History
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