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Overview: By 1812, Napoleon had succeeded in subduing most of his enemies – though in Spain, the British continued to be a perpetual thorn in his flank that drained the Empire of money and troops – but his relationship with Russia, never more than one of mutual suspicion at best, had now grown downright hostile. At the heart of it, aside from the obvious mistrust that two huge superpowers intent on dividing up Europe felt for one another, was Napoleon’s Continental blockade. Russia had initially agreed to uphold the blockade in the Treaty of Tilsit, but they had since taken to ignoring it altogether. Napoleon wanted an excuse to teach Russia a lesson.
Napoleon wasted no time attempting to defuse the situation. He increased his Grande Armee to 450,000 fighting men and prepared it for invasion. On July 23, 1812, he launched his army across the border, despite the protestations of many of his Marshals. The Russian Campaign had begun, and it would turn out to be Napoleon’s biggest blunder. Russia’s great strategic depth already had a habit of swallowing armies, a fact many would-be conquerors learned the hard way. Napoleon, exceptional though he was in so many regards, proved that even military genius can do little in the face of the Russian winter and the resilience of its people.
From a purely military standpoint, much of the campaign seemed to be going in Napoleon’s favor since he met with little opposition as he pushed forwards into the interior with his customary lightning speed, but gradually this lack of engagements became a hindrance more than a help; Napoleon needed to bring the Russians to battle if he was to defeat them. On September 7, 1812, he must have thought his prayers had finally been answered, as the Russians had decided to stand and fight almost at the very gates of Moscow. Through his looking glass, Napoleon’s well-trained eye observed the weakness of his opponent’s defensive position. French and allied infantry advanced, anticipating that their Russian foes would again break as they had done two months earlier at Smolensk. The cavalry and Imperial Guard stood ready to complete the rout, this time preventing any organized withdrawal, and laying open an unopposed march to seize Moscow. Tsar Alexander I, lacking the means for continued resistance, would have to capitulate. After nearly two decades of dominating his foes on two continents, Napoleon was on the precipice of eliminating the eastern threat to his empire.
On the receiving end of the French emperor’s glance was a Russian army faced with making a decisive stand before their capital. Bloodied badly in the first clash of the main armies, they had retreated skillfully under pressure, frustrating Napoleon’s attempts to finish them off. Utilizing their knowledge of the land, the Russians had preserved the remainder of the forward army while also generating additional forces to bolster the ranks for what was shaping up to be the final battle in defense of Moscow. They also stripped the land of anything useful for the French, forcing them to depend on long supply lines back to Prussia, while disease and desertion reduced Napoleon’s initially superior force. Tsar Alexander I had recently ordered a change of command, replacing the non-ethnic Russian commander at Smolensk, symbolizing that his empire would continue or end under the leadership of a Russian.
The Battle of Borodino, as it was later called, resulted in a combined casualty toll of over 75,000, a hideously long butcher’s bill that represented the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars. The Russian army retreated and Napoleon was able to occupy Moscow, hoping this would persuade the tsar to sue for peace. However, even as his advance guard pushed into the city, the retreating Russians put the capital to the torch. The Russian army’s retreat also ensured that it would live to fight another day, if necessary.
Genre: Non-Fiction > History
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